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In the June 2009 elections for the European parliament, the extreme rightist move-
ment in the Netherlands, Partij voor Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV), was the big 
winner, and in 2010, in a unique political construction, the party became an informal
participant in the government. Despite this, it is the rare voice in the Netherlands
that would openly suggest that we are witnessing a growth in racist sentiments
(Riemen).1 Interviews in the media with the supporters of the PVV show that the rea-
sons for their support are quite diverse, yet the anti-Islam rhetoric of the party seems
to dominate. Here is a statement from one of the supporters referring to migrants:
“Yes, I have had it. I understand that people take the chances we give them but we
accept too much from them” (van Been 2).
A large number among the Dutch population are supportive of the harsh language
used by politicians and others against Islamic migrants in the Netherlands. There
seems to be resistance to use of the term racism to describe the clear expression of
discriminatory sentiments. Instead, there are various types of reactions to recent
developments. The first reaction is discomfort with the developments and leads to a
kind of self-imposed ignorance (position of the innocent). The second reaction can be
described as one of panic in which political and public discussions are mainly
focused on the supporters of Geert Wilders, leader of the PVV. In the case of politi-
cal parties, this panic has an extra edge to it: the loss of votes. This has led various
parties to the partial adoption of Wilder’s approach to migration and integration. The
third reaction is criticism of the harsh tone used by Wilders, while showing sympathy
for his supporters by focusing on the growing discomfort and insecurity among the
“native” Dutch. In this chapter, I would like to show that all these reactions only touch
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upon the surface of the situation and do not go deeply enough to uncover the basic
assumptions underlying the developments described above. The main focus of my
argument is on the Dutch approach to new migrants of (perceived) Islamic back-
grounds as opposed to other categories of “migrants” who came to the Netherlands
in the earlier decades, such as the Indo-Dutch and Surinamese.
The assumption underlying the reactions portrayed above is that Dutch society
belongs to the native Dutch and that they have the right to feel discomfort about the
growing “threat” caused by certain groups of migrants. A quite telling example is 
the statement of Prime Minister Mark Rutte in March 2011, after the results of the
state elections, when he said, “We will make sure, ladies and gentlemen, that we give
this beautiful country back to the Dutch, because this is our project.”2 Also, most of
the studies on migrants presented in the media support this assumption. Take, for
example, the same newspaper that reported the election results of PVV as its cover
story juxtaposed with a story on “schrikbarende misdaadcijfers” (shocking crime 
statistics) based on data presented by professor of criminology Frank Bovenkerk. 
His data show that 55 percent of Moroccan-Dutch men in Rotterdam between 18 and
24 have had contact with the police at least once. He goes on to report that the
chance of a repeat offence is 90 percent (van Been 4).3
The recent discussions on integration in the Netherlands are informed by feelings
of discomfort and fear of the growing influence of migrants from Islamic countries on
society. 
In addition, we see increasing insistence that migrants distance themselves from
“backward” elements of their own culture, which are assumed to be in contrast with
Dutch culture. This is particularly true regarding gender equality and space for homo-
sexuality. Public discussion implies that this distance will lead to cultural adaptation
to Dutch society. Every reaction that acknowledges the insecure feelings of the
“native Dutch” justifies the critique of migrant culture as well. Here we can observe
a clear double standard: It is OK for the “native Dutch” to feel defensive and to pro-
tect their culture, but migrants are criticized for defending theirs. Migrants are seen
as the ones who need to adopt or even assimilate into the new culture. Not many
people would consider this asymmetric approach racist, since it is believed that the
discussion is about culture and not about race (see also Schinkel on this). This begs
the question of why the discussion of the culture of migrants focuses on how it needs
to change, yet discussion of the culture of the “native Dutch” recognizes the reasons
for a defensive attitude. This double standard has two dimensions. One, it is founded
in a deeply rooted notion of the superiority of cultures. Although this idea of superi-
ority of Dutch culture does not yet enjoy broad and open public support, it has
become increasingly and openly acknowledged by certain politicians. In 2004,
VVD-politician Bolkestein spoke at the Humboldt University in Germany about the
advantages of embracing a Leitkultur in the Netherlands. This was part of a more
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general, severe attack on “cultural relativism.” Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Rita Verdonk both
proposed that Dutch culture was better because of its equality and openness, as
opposed to Islamic culture, which is defined as oppressive and violent. In other 
publications, I have elaborated specifically on gender related notions of this homo-
genized presentation of cultures (Ghorashi, “From Absolute”). Second, it is taken for
granted that the natives of the country have the right to claim their culture, because
they were here first, while the newcomers have to change their culture and assimilate
into a new one. Verena Stolcke has referred to this culturist presence as “cultural
fundamentalism,” a term that she explains as a new form of exclusion rhetoric in the
West based on a homogeneous, static, coherent, and rooted notion of culture. This
time, it is not the race that needs to be protected, but the assumed historically rooted
homogeneity of the nation: “racism without race” (Stolcke). In addition, a broader
definition of racism (such as that of Philomena Essed, “Everyday Racism”) could also
provide a framework to grasp this new exclusionary rhetoric. No matter which choice
is made, it seems that any reference to racism in the Dutch context elicits either an
exaggerated and dismissive reaction in the public arena or complete silence.4
Fear or Outrage?
The spread of exclusionary rhetoric about migrants is often explained as fear of
change attributed to growing diversity and insecurity in a global world believed to be
heading towards a “clash of civilizations.” I have followed this line of argumentation
in my earlier work, as well (Ghorashi, Paradoxen). Fear freezes people and makes
them reactive. It encourages them to protect their boundaries rather than open them
up. This fear of change has been strengthened by a growth in violence in various 
residential areas and on the streets. Because these incidents of violence are exten-
sively reported in the media (van Dijk, Vliegenthart) even people who have not faced
any violence personally become fearful that it may happen to them in the future. 
In addition to the effects of negative media coverage of migrants, there have been
several global and national incidents which have deepened the tensions within Dutch
society. Conflicts in the Middle East along with various violent attacks, beginning with
September 11, 2001, have contributed to a changing image of Muslims as danger-
ous representatives of an aggressive world power. The 2004 murder of Theo van
Gogh corroborated that view. These changing global and domestic situations partly
explain the growing tension and negativity toward Islamic migrants within Dutch 
society. But why do people who hate migrants—even if they hate some more than
others—because they are fearful and defensive—not want to be accused of racism?
Why is racism so adamantly denied in the Netherlands? To find an answer to this
question, we need a different line of reasoning.
Paradoxically, it was the logic of one of the rightist opinion leaders appearing in a
television interview that brought me closer to answering this question. He explained
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that people like him are not afraid of the migrants, but outraged. The pundit claimed
that the Dutch had done their best for different groups of migrants and had made
efforts to accept them into society but that those efforts had been met with ingrati-
tude by migrants who had taken advantage of Dutch hospitality. This illuminates the
quote at the beginning of this paper in which one of the supporters of Wilders men-
tions that he has “had enough.” The oft-heard voice in rightist discourse is that there
will be no more special treatment for migrants. Migrants, they tell us, will no longer
be coddled (referring to the word knuffelen in Dutch), as they supposedly had been in
the 1980s. They see migrants as ungrateful of the tolerance and openness of Dutch
society. As Essed and Nimako put it: the Dutch feel victims of their own tolerance
now that ethnic minorities are so ungrateful. It is the general belief that the condition
of openness and tolerance that is presumed to have existed in the 1980s did not
lead to integration—read assimilation—of migrants into society. Additionally, the
claim is that migrants are not doing their best to make something of their lives. They
are, in fact, asking too much from society. Departing from this line of reasoning, it
makes sense that none would want to hear that their arguments are racist. They see
themselves as simply reclaiming their country. They are furious and they are only
defending what is theirs: what’s wrong with that?
In this paper, I analyze this line of argumentation in two different ways. First, I
counter the assumption that migrants were coddled during the 1980s and that soci-
ety has already done enough for them. Second, I analyze the grounds for the assump-
tion that migrants should be grateful for all of the things they have received from
Dutch society. By doing so, I will show that the whole notion of hospitality and cod-
dling is connected to a categorical approach to migrants in which they have always
been considered deviant from the Dutch norm and in need of special attention
because of their inherent shortcomings. This approach presumes that Dutch society
is a generous patron of poor, needy migrants.
In the following sections, I begin with a short description of Dutch history on migra-
tion issues. By doing so, I show that the claim of openness, generosity and tolerance
toward migrants is situated within this specific history. After that, I use the work of
scholars such as Harrel-Bond to explore the relationship between gift and gratitude.
I end by connecting these elements in order to explain why the term racism, and schol-
ars on critical studies of racism, have rarely been given a voice in the Netherlands.5
The Foundation of Migration Policy6
Until 1980, Dutch state policy toward new migrants (as opposed to the migrations
from Dutch ex-colonies) was formed with the idea that the present migrants would
one day return to their home countries. Historically, this had to do with the migration
of so-called guest workers to the Netherlands at the end of the 1950s when there
was a great shortage in the labor market. With the migrants’ return in the back of 
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policymakers’ minds, until 1980 policy was mainly aimed at maintaining the cultural
identity of migrants rather than their integration into Dutch society. In the 1980s, the
Dutch government shifted its policy regarding guest workers when it realized that
migration, once viewed as temporary, had gained a more permanent character. The
status of this group changed to “(im)migrant” (Lutz 99) and the focus of the policy
changed toward integration. The disadvantaged position of the migrants in the
Netherlands formed the main basis of the new Minority Note of 1983. The concept
of “guest workers” no longer applied and the term “minority” was introduced as the
official label for newcomers in the Netherlands. The Minority Note focused on creat-
ing an equal position for minorities in Dutch society. The new slogan was: “integrat-
ing while preserving one’s own identity.” The policymakers believed that minorities
should be provided with insights, attitudes and skills to enable them to function in
Dutch society.
At the end of the 1980s, this minority policy came under severe pressure. More
attention had to be given to integration, with less attention to cultural background.
This criticism formed the foundation of the report on allochthonous (non-native Dutch
citizens) policy, in which the WRR (Dutch Council on Governmental Policy) advised the
government in 1989 to put more emphasis on integration. In 1994, again advised by
the WRR, the minority policy was replaced with an integration policy. In the report,
allochthonous were again defined as “problem categories.” On top of that, the focus
shifted from groups that shared the same cultural background (“ethnic minorities”)
to individual representatives of the super category: “non-native” (“allochthonous”).
The contradiction here is that the term allochthonous is not connected to any partic-
ular cultural background and hence individualizes, while categorizing at the same
time. In the 1990s, the concepts of naturalization and integration were on everyone’s
lips, replacing the (partially) accepted notion of “preservation of own cultural back-
ground” in the two preceding decades. In 1998, the Law on the Naturalization of
Newcomers came into effect. The focus on naturalization was instigated by the rela-
tively new idea that migrants were here to stay. The mandatory character of this new
law, however, gave rise to criticism, because it harkened back to forced assimilation
(Entzinger).
Policymakers discussed and decided; papers and terminology were changed, yet
the essence remained the same: whether people were labelled as guest workers,
migrants, minorities, or allochtonous, they were, and remained, problem categories
with a deviant culture. When looking at these developments around the issue of
migration, we can conclude that categorical thinking, with its powerful socio-cultural
and socio-economic components, has remained a crucial feature of thinking on
migrant issues in the Netherlands. This means that the various policy shifts have
never called into question or exposed the basic assumptions (that is, the socio-
cultural and socio-economic non-conformity of migrants) underlying these policies.
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“Allochtonization,” Pillarization, and the Welfare State
In order to understand the present “allochtonization”—or culturalization—as a 
dominant discourse in Dutch society, it needs to be situated in the context of two 
historical phenomena: pillarization and the welfare state.
The construction of pillars—“own worlds”—along lines of religious denominations
and political ideologies has long been the dominant framework for dealing with dif-
ferences in the Netherlands. Studies about the pillar system are so diverse that it is
impossible to include an all-encompassing overview of them in this paper. Still, a
short outline is necessary for my further argumentation. Political scientist Pennings
calls pillars “separated institutional complexes of religiously or ideologically moti-
vated institutions and members, which are marked along the same boundaries in dif-
ferent social sectors” (21). He describes pillarization as “the process in which after
1880 Catholics, orthodox Protestants and social democrats have gradually institu-
tionalized their mutual differences” (21). Despite the variation within the pillars, the
“own worlds” concept persuaded the members that the boundaries of the pillars
were clear. In addition, most social activities were organized within individual pillars.
This dichotomy between “us” and “them” stems from an essentialist approach
toward one’s own group and that of others, something which has latently shaped the
way in which new migrants have been approached in the Netherlands.
It is very likely that the habitus of pillarization continued when the new migrants
came to the Netherlands, which contributed to the assumption that their cultures
were entirely different from that of the Dutch. Sociologist Koopmans holds that the
relationship between Dutch society and its migrants is strongly rooted in the pillar-
ized tradition. The pillarized system, which in the early twentieth century was a suc-
cessful pacifying element in the conflicts between local religious and political groups,
has been reintroduced as an instrument of integration (Koopmans 166, 167). The
influence of this pillarized history on migrants is most clearly witnessed in migrants
from Islamic countries. Policymakers and academics considered this group to be a
new kind of pillar. Here we encounter contrary processes: after the welfare state had
made pillars redundant by taking on roles once held by the community, a new dis-
course started to grow about the creation of a new pillar in the relatively de-pillarized
Netherlands. Logically it seems misplaced to think of a new pillar in a country that
has struggled to prove that it is a de-pillarized society in which the emphasis is on
individual autonomy against pressure by a group. In actuality, however, the influence
of pillarization did not suddenly disappear due to the realization that it was no longer
necessary: the effects of pillarization on various social fields continued, albeit in a
less explicit form. Thus, the forms and patterns of pillarization were present and
could enable, or even stimulate, the development of a new pillar. Yet, the field of 
tension sketched earlier shows the confusing situation that recent migrants from
Islamic background faced. The habitus of pillarization translated into minority 
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thinking. It left—and even created—space for these migrants to preserve their own
culture, especially when it was still generally assumed that they would return to their
home countries. At the same time, this space for group formation on a cultural or 
religious basis formed a foundation of uneasiness and discomfort for the Dutch
majority population. At a time when the majority was believed to be freed from the
limitations and pressures of the group, there is a new group in the society which
claims its rights: a group believed to be traditional in many ways. The increasing aver-
sion to the existence of this new pillar (with predominantly traditional ideas) focused
on the suppression of the individual freedom of members of the group.
Thinking in terms of pillars affects more than Islamic migrants alone. To a certain
extent, it has demarcated thinking about cultural differences and ethnic boundaries.
This has led to the increase of cultural contrasts that make it virtually impossible 
to consider the individual migrant as separate from his or her cultural or ethnic 
category. Categories are indispensable for providing an insight into the world, but 
as soon as these categories change into dichotomies, they have a limiting effect.
Constructing and dealing with differences vis-à-vis migrants has been done in various
ways throughout history. Consistently, however, migrants—even those with a non-
Islamic background—have been considered a deviation from the Dutch standard.7
This demonstrated that the obstinacy of the pillarized habitus has both shaped and
preserved the culturalization component of categorical thinking.
Another development, which informed the deficit-component of categorical think-
ing, was the rise of the welfare state. The basis of this development was an increas-
ing tendency toward the principle of equality, resulting in discontent about existing
inequality. In its early stage, this dissatisfaction regarding the “unsociables”8 went
hand in hand with a tendency to isolate these groups in order to restyle them into
decent citizens (Lucassen). As a result, all citizens were entitled to equal opportuni-
ties, but in some cases it was more important to first liberate them from their socially
disadvantaged position. It had become the essence of the welfare state to worry
about disadvantaged groups and to see to it that their disadvantaged positions were
eliminated. This need caused an increase in the number of welfare organizations in
the Netherlands. Apart from that, the rise of the welfare state in the Netherlands
reduced the need for individuals to become part of a group in order to survive. This
resulted in more space for the individual to develop and demand autonomy.
Simultaneously, these developments contributed to the creation of government-
dependent categories of people that needed to be helped out of a disadvantaged
position. The regulating effect of striving for equality has been a growing uneasiness
toward those who are considered social deficits or as a kind of lower class, as well
as a fixation on reshaping this disadvantaged category (Lucassen). The often-
unintended result is that even active and capable people are easily reduced to 
helpless creatures.9 Moreover, striving for equality can, at times, quickly change 
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into uneasiness, not only about inequality but also about difference. That which is dif-
ferent is looked upon with distrust and is sometimes too easily placed into the “dis-
advantaged” category. Despite the positive effect of the welfare state on personal
space and the struggle against the social divide, it has also been an important breed-
ing ground for categorical thinking about migrants as groups that are in a socially 
disadvantaged position. 
Clearly, this combination of deficit-thinking—stimulated by the welfare state—and
the tendency toward culturalization—fuelled by the history of pillarization—have been
persistent factors of categorical thinking in the Netherlands. Even if the cultural back-
ground of migrants was seen as positive in the 1980s, thinking about that back-
ground remained categorical because migrant cultures were primarily considered as
something completely different, or as deviating from the standard. The paradox here,
though, is that the rise of anti-migrant hostility at this moment coincides with the dis-
mantling of the welfare state, and the rising insecurity brought about by neo-liberalist
reforms.
So What Has Changed?
In the era that is now commonly called the “post-Fortuyn” period, we have seen new
modes of categorical thinking arise. We see, for instance, that the emphasis on the
negative consequences of cultural contrasts or culturalization has gained much
greater prominence and is now much in evidence in the “Islamization” of the dis-
course. The Dutch public sphere is filled with a wide range of utterances from politi-
cians and public figures showing their disgust or discomfort with Islam and Islamic
migrants. Examples of this are the film Fitna (in 2008 with anti-Koran passages) made
by Geert Wilders, then a member of parliament and an informal part of the government
from 2010–2012, and the launch of the new political movement Trots Op Nederland
(Proud of Netherlands) in 2007 by the former minister of integration, Rita Verdonk,
who warns us against the loss of Dutch norms and values. Even the proclaimed high
quality media do not hesitate to join the crowd in this tirade against Islam. Hardly a
day goes by without discussion or some presentation in the Dutch media concerning
Islam. But what is different now compared to previous decades, other than the
increased attention to Islam in the public sphere? What has changed considerably
since 2000 is a shift in tone, demanding, “We should be able to say what we think.”
Baukje Prins calls this period the era of “the new realism.” The new realist is some-
one with guts; someone who dares to call a spade a spade; someone who sets him-
self up as the mouthpiece of the common people and then puts up a vigorous fight
against the so-called left-wing, “politically correct” views of cultural relativism.
In retrospect, the culturalist statements made by Frits Bolkestein in the early
1990s can be seen as the start of the period of new realism. Pim Fortuyn took it to
the next level by radicalizing new realism into a kind of hyperrealism in which “the
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guts to tell the truth” became an end in itself, irrespective of the consequences
(Prins). Once a scholar and publicist, Fortuyn’s impact was remarkable when he was
chosen as the leader of the newly established party, Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable
Netherlands), and succeeded in greatly increasing the party’s popularity among the
Dutch. This, together with the prominence he gained in the media, shocked old-
school politicians. His success with the Dutch public was greatly enhanced by the
events of September 11, 2001. In the minds of many, the potential enmity of Islamic
migrants that Bolkestein discussed in the 1990s changed from speculation to fact.
This made it easier for Fortuyn to say things that had been implied earlier, but had
never been made explicit. In a February 9, 2002 interview in de Volkskrant, Fortuyn
used phrases such as “Islam is a backward culture” or “the real refugees do not
reach Holland”—comments that unsettled the foundation of Dutch politics.
The dominance of this hyperrealism, when combined with the September 11
attacks and the assassinations of Fortuyn in 2002 and Van Gogh in 2004, has
caused thinking in terms of cultural contrasts to be linked to feelings of fear and 
discontent. As a consequence, migrants and, hence, migrant cultures, in particular
those with an Islamic background, are now viewed with aversion and mistrust. These
views are being translated into policy and public debate. Ayaan Hirsi Ali deepened the
gender component of this new realist discourse. Ayaan Hirsi Ali is probably one of the
time’s most controversial politicians. In her public appearances, she chose to be con-
frontational, referring to Islam as fundamentally women-unfriendly. In the film
Submission, she again chose a tack of confrontation by showing the verses of the
Koran written on the naked body of a molested woman. Many prominent—mainly
white Dutch—figures in the Netherlands supported Hirsi Ali and the media gave her
fame. Primarily white mainstream feminists and middle and upper middle class white
males supported Ayaan’s position, calling her the pioneer of the third feminist wave
in the Netherlands.
This line of approach has grown and hardened in the public sphere in the
Netherlands. The dominant pattern in these debates is strongly rooted in the sup-
posed superiority of European culture, which rates migrant cultures as inferior. Yet,
in spite of a clear distance from past discourses, I argue that the assimilative, hard
approach of new realism would never have acquired such a following if the basic
assumptions of categorical thinking had not already been present in the dominant
discourse on migrants. What happened, in fact, was that the hitherto silent negative
feelings with respect to migrants could finally be expressed in public. In the following
section, I will elaborate on the differences between the soft and hard approaches.
The Building Blocks of the Soft Approach
Since the 1970s, categorical thinking combined with an essentialist approach to cul-
ture has become characteristic of public discourse in the Netherlands. Until the new
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realist discourse began dominating public space, migrants were seen as groups with
a completely different culture who needed to be tolerated. The main objective of the
resigned regime of tolerance was pacification. The idea was to accept the fact that
the other is different, but to refrain from establishing an intrinsic connection. This
type of tolerance was typical of the era of pillarization. The pillars tolerated the exis-
tence of one another, but in general did not look for interaction. During pillarization,
respect for the “walls” between the pillars had become more important than respect
for the content of the pillars (Ghorashi, Ways to Survive). This form of tolerance was
also applied to the so-called new Islamic pillar. People who were believed to belong
to this pillar were tolerated out of custom because earlier cases had shown that this
attitude would result in pacification. However, what had been successful during pil-
larization would not work for this new group of migrants. The problem revolved around
their connection to Dutch identity, which had not been a point of discussion during
the time of pillarization, but which would have to be created for the new Dutch.
Tolerance without involvement and interaction could not create enough opportunities
for the new migrants to establish an emotional interaction with Dutch identity, and
therefore, social pacification. 
Simultaneously, a different sort of tolerance was present during this period, which
was based on a simplified definition of cultural-relativism. The other culture was dif-
ferent by definition, but all cultures were equal in principle. Departing from this idea,
everything the other said or did was accepted because it was different, whereas all
deviating behavior was explained as originating from this cultural otherness. At first,
this approach may seem to have been a positive one, but its most noteworthy char-
acteristics appear to be indifference and passivity. This type of multiculturalism,
defined by McLaren as leftist-liberal multiculturalism, defines otherness as essential
and as something interesting and exotic.10 In that sense, this approach is an essen-
tialist one as well, and can be defined as categorical thinking. As a result, “allochtho-
nous” people are often extolled in practice, mainly because they are allochthonous.
If migrants are largely seen as completely different, this does not result in an increas-
ing trans-ethnic involvement and interaction, but rather in a blind spot toward the
manifold possibilities and talents of migrants.
Categorical thinking (incorporating the essentialist approach toward migrant cul-
ture and the belief in their disadvantaged position) in the era of the so-called soft
approach has resulted in a lack of discussion surrounding the basic assumptions
concerning the role and position of migrants in Dutch society. This implies that
migrants have never been approached and treated as full members of society. It has
resulted in both an increase in negative feelings regarding migrants and in a weak or
even non-existent emotional connection between migrants and Dutch society. This
source of uneasiness and mutual misunderstanding has been a powerful breeding
ground for the rise of today’s hard approach. Despite strong criticism in the past with
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respect to integration, the origin of “hyperrealism” is to be situated historically within
the era of so-called political correctness.
Both the hard and soft approach are rooted in terms of cultural contrasts and in
the conviction that migrants have shortcomings that they need to overcome. There
have been shifts in tone (from soft to harsh), in focus (from socio-economic to socio-
cultural), and in outlook (from optimistic to pessimistic). These shifts, however, have
had little bearing on the substance of the approach to migrants, since what remained
consistent in both the positive and negative approaches was the assumption that
migrants are completely different from the Dutch (they have not been considered as
full citizens) with particular cultural characteristics that are incompatible with
Western society. Those characteristics are seen as deficits that must be countered
as clearly and strongly as possible. It is this basic understanding of the position and
the situation of migrants within Dutch society that informs the justification of the
present outrage of the dominant group toward migrants. This attitude fits perfectly
within the historically rooted categorical thinking on migration that I elaborated on
earlier. 
Migrants as Dependants of the State
The deficit component of the categorical approach to migrants related to the effects
of the welfare state created a tacit understanding of the position of migrants in the
Netherlands. It has been assumed that they need help in order to participate fully in
Dutch society. This construction of categories in society that are in need of help is
countered by categories of people who provide help. This kind of category construc-
tion leads to a hierarchical relationship between the giver and the receiver. It also
develops a strong sense of expectation of gratitude from migrants. Those not seen
to be appropriately grateful are considered manipulative. This line of argument is
especially developed in refugee studies. Leading figure in the field of refugees
Barbara Harrell-Bond’s study of aid organizations, for example, describes some of the
images related to refugees. “The documents I obtained from agencies emphasized
images of helpless, starving masses who depend on agents of compassion to keep
them alive” (Harrell-Bond 147). This image “of helpless refugees, desperately in
need, reinforces the view that outsiders are needed to help them. [. . .] The 
standard image of the helpless refugee also reinforces the view of their incapability,
motivating people from all walks of life to offer their services” (150). Refugees and
many migrants become a category of people who are dependent on governments and
organizations, and who are thus a burden on their host societies. These studies of
the hierarchical foundation of providing help base their analysis on Marcel Mauss’s
work on gift-giving (1925). In his work, he shows that there is always a notion of 
reciprocity attached to any gift. He shows “that the act of giving is not simply 
mechanical; the gift defines the status and power relationships which exist between
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the giver and the one who receives it” (Mauss in Harrell-Bond 149). Thus, even if
there is no direct expectation of something in return, gratitude is always expected.
I have often experienced this sense of expectation in terms of gratitude during my
life in the Netherlands. I came to the Netherlands in 1988 as an asylum seeker, but
gained citizenship in 1994. Since my academic work has been on migration and inte-
gration issues, I have been an active participant in Dutch public debates since the
end of 1990s. These public activities accelerated when it was announced that I
would occupy the chair of Managing Diversity and Integration in 2005. Since then,
I have made many public appearances on the issue both in the media and from 
various public podia. As a result of my somewhat critical analysis of Dutch society,
on various occasions I have been confronted by complete strangers who write to tell me
that I should be more grateful for the opportunities that Dutch society has given me.
By saying that, these people create a hierarchical position between me as a grateful
receiver of help opposed to Dutch society as the provider of that help. In addition,
they also use this hierarchical condition to de-legitimize both my position as a scholar
and my critical analysis of the society. Any claim on my part to be considered a full
citizen and not a second class-citizen who always has to be careful about what she
says because she needs to be grateful backfires. This claim can again be used as
another example of what I am accused of: as ungrateful for the help I have received.
There is no way out of this vicious circle as long as the assumption of help provided
related to gratefulness remains intact. The migrant or any other recipient of help
remains the loser.
I use this personal anecdote to show the visibility of the dominant pattern of the
new negative and exclusionary rhetoric against migrants. The supporters of this hard
line exclusionary rhetoric think of themselves as victims rather than aggressors. They
are believed to be victims of the physical, spatial, and cultural violence of the
migrants. They only defend what is theirs, goes the argument. From this line of rea-
soning, they will not accept being called racist because they consider themselves to
be people who are of good will and intention. Dutch society has an international rep-
utation for being generous in charity based on its available budget for development
issues. They also believe themselves to have been charitable toward migrants, since
it is their tax money that has been used to support the dependent groups in the 
society, which are mainly considered to be migrants. However, various studies show
that over-subsidizing has a way of making people dependent where they could 
have been entrepreneurial and responsible for their own lives (Harrell-Bond, Ghorashi
“Refugees”). Yet, this does not impact the assumptions informing the Dutch feeling
of outrage when all “their” charitable efforts toward migrants remain not only unan-
swered in the form of gratitude, but answered in the form of growing assertiveness
and violence. The only thing happening now is that they (the Dutch majority) are not
taking it anymore. Thus, the framework through which discriminatory acts toward
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migrants are justified is not defined as racist but as a natural attitude of defence.
Using the term “racism” is then seen as a weapon that is used by those ungrateful,
spoiled migrants and their supporters to silence their opponents.
Through this analysis I have tried to show that the categorical foundation of the
discourse toward migrants in the 1980s—even that with a positive connotation—
was the breeding ground for the growing negative discourse toward migrants. The cul-
turalist approach of viewing migrants as being absolutely other in society, combined
with the deficit approach of seeing migrants as dependents of the welfare state, has
served as a strong foundation. In the 1980s, migrants were tolerated as absolute
others because they were not seen as a threat to the state and were not assertive
enough to claim equal citizenship. When the culture and religion of migrants transi-
tioned from being viewed as not only different but also dangerous after 2001, we
observe how thin the boundary has been between the charity-like positive approach
and the protective negative approach toward the same migrants now. This explains
why so many well-intentioned and highly educated Dutch citizens have chosen to
blame migrants themselves for the dominant negative discourse in the society. The
fact remains, that both in the times of positive and negative rhetoric, new Dutch citi-
zens have always been considered absolute others in the society, to be tolerated as
long as they do not pose a threat, in which case they are threatened with expulsion.
What remains consistent is that migrants are responsible for the positions taken by
the dominant majority. The irony here is that migrants are considered (fully) respon-
sible for the actions of the majority, yet are not considered full participants in Dutch
society. It is this justification process rooted in the historical past which allows the
majority to shirk responsibility for their actions and refuse to acknowledge their exclu-
sionary rhetoric as racist. This is exactly how majorities end up being right all the
time; in addition to having numbers in their favor, they also have the means and
access to the public space to provide, reinforce, and dominate the image of the other
which suits them the most.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown the main reason for the allergy toward the concept of
racism in the Netherlands. I started by showing the historical rootedness of the pres-
ent harshness toward migrants. To do that, I focused on the categorical approach to
migration in the 1980s as the foundation for the present Islamization of the dis-
course. In addition, I showed that the idea of the superiority of Dutch culture is linked
to the notion of helping the needy and its connection to the idea of gratefulness. 
I argued that this specific attitude toward charity is connected to the basic assump-
tions of a welfare state and so seems to fit quite well within the thinking that cate-
gorizes migrants as people in need. The conclusion of my paper is that there is not
a disruption but rather a connection between the present hard and negative rhetoric
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and that of previous decades. The source of the connection is in the manner through
which culture has served as an absolute category of otherness. In addition, categor-
ical thinking within the context of the welfare state provides the foundation for the
Dutch image as charitable and open: an image that justifies the present outrage
against migrants as being so ungrateful. It is this process of justification linked to the
self-image of the Dutch which makes it almost impossible to accept the notion of
racism as part of their image. This resistance will stay intact as long as this histori-
cally rooted categorical grounding is not challenged. As long as the superiority of
Dutch culture is unquestioned and unexamined as the foundation of the dominant
discourse concerning migrants—even those who are second and third generation
and have Dutch nationality—there can be no space to acknowledge racism in the
Netherlands. Without that, the society is not able to prepare itself for the conse-
quences of growing racism. Even more problematic in the long run is that, as long as
there is no acknowledgement of racism in the Netherlands, there can be no strong
movement against racism.
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Notes
1. Interesting also is the controversy around the
planned lecture of Von der Dunk in the province
house of North Holland. The lecture was
cancelled because of the link which was made
between PVV and World War II: http://opinie.
volkskrant.nl/artikel/show/id/8356/Het_nieuwe
_taboe_op_de_oorlog, last visited 28 Apr. 2011.
2. “We gaan er gewoon voor zorgen, dames en
heren, dat we dat prachtige land weer teruggeven
aan de Nederlanders, want dat is ons project.”
http://sargasso.nl/archief/2011/03/03/rutte-
dat-prachtige-land-weer-teruggeven-aan-de-
nederlanders/, last visited 28 Apr. 2011.
3. For more on negative representation and
criminalization of migrants in the media, see 
van Dijk.
4. For an example of this, see the piece by
Meindert Fennema in the Dutch newspaper, de
Volkskrant, 3 Dec. 2008 entitled, “Racisme
zonder ras is gevaarlijke onzin”: http://
religionresearch.org/martijn/2008/03/13/
de-volkskrant-fennema-racisme-zonder-ras-is-
gevaarlijke-onzin/, last visited 27 July 2009.
5. For an extensive analysis on this, see 
Essed and Nimako.
6. Parts of the arguments presented in the
following four paragraphs were first published 
in Ghorashi, Paradoxen.
7. For more on this see Lutz, Schuster and
Willems, Cottaar and Van Aken.
8. See Rath.
9. For a specific analysis of the impact of the
Dutch welfare state on refugees, see Ghorashi,
“Refugees” and Hollands.
10. It is important to note that McLaren’s
analysis is not a critique of all forms of
multiculturalism but a critique of essentialist
forms of multiculturalism. He does identify a
critical form of multiculturalism.
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